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1  Introduction 
Whether verbs have to be marked as punctual vs. durative has been a 
controversial issue from the very beginnings of research on aktionsarten in 
the last century right on up to modern theories of aspectual classes and 
aspect composition. Debates about the linguistic necessity of this distinction 
have often been accompanied by the question of what it means for a verb to 
be temporally punctual.  
In this paper I will, firstly, sketch the history of research on the 
punctual-durative distinction and present several linguistic arguments in its 
favor. Secondly, I will show how this distinction is captured in an event-
structure-based approach to lexical semantics. Thirdly, I will discuss the 
extent to which a precise definition of the notions used in lexical 
representations helps avoid circular argumentation in lexical semantics. 
Finally, I will demonstrate how this can be done for the notion of 
‘punctuality’ by clarifying the logical type of this predicate and relating it to 
central cognitive time concepts. 
2  Evidence for Punctuality in the Lexicon 
The notions of ‘punctuality’ and ‘durativity’ have been extensively em-
ployed in research on aspectuality, i.e., research on grammatical aspect, 
aktionsarten, Vendler classes and the like. Among the earliest approaches to 
these phenomena are theories on grammatical aspect, in particular the dis-
tinction between the classical Greek aorist stem and present stem and on the 
aspect system in Slavic languages. The perfective aspect in Greek and 
Slavic has often been described as ‘punctual’, the imperfective aspect as 
‘durative’ (e.g. Schleicher 1855, Pott 1859, Curtius 1863). This approach 
has not proven very fruitful but it should be kept in mind that until the early 
twentieth century a distinction between grammatical aspect and lexical phe-
nomena like aktionsart had not been made.1  
                                                        
1Aspect is nowadays usually understood to be a grammatical category alongside 
others such as tense, mode, etc., which is paradigmatically applied to verb forms by 
Little by little, phenomena more closely related to the lexical meaning 
of verbs entered into linguistic discussion.2 Observations concerning the 
distribution of adverbials denoting a span of time go as far back as Romberg 
(1899). These adverbials (e.g., in two hours) usually combine with verbs 
denoting durative events with a result state (1)3. If combined with punctual 
change of state verbs they often sound odd (2), unless a preceding event can 
either be anchored in context as a reference point for the beginning of the 
interval (3), or is lexically presupposed. In (4), for example, it is pre-
supposed that Rebecca had been moving towards the summit: 
(1) Rebecca wrote the paper in six weeks 
(2) ??Rebecca’s vase broke in two minutes 
(3) Rebecca pressed the button and the bomb exploded in two minutes 
(4) Rebecca reached the summit in two hours 
Two things should be noticed: Firstly, even if the interval denoted by 
the in-phrase is very short, the beginning of the interval seems to be 
anchored in some contextually salient event when the phrase is combined 
with a punctual verb. In (3) the beginning of the interval is the event when 
Rebecca pressed the button; the sentence is not interpreted in the sense that 
the explosion itself took three seconds. This is reflected by the fact that in 
these cases the in-phrase can be replaced by a PP headed by after (cf. Piñon 
1997): (3) is equivalent to (5) but (1) is not equivalent to (6). 
(5) Rebecca pressed the button and the bomb exploded after two minutes 
(6) Rebecca wrote the paper after six weeks 
Secondly, punctual verbs that presuppose a preceding durative event 
are characterized by the fact that punctual adverbials unambigously refer to 
                                                                                                                      
means of inflection, derivation or stem formation, while aktionsart is taken to be a 
lexical category derived from the lexical meaning of verbs and which - if it is 
related to specific morphemes at all - is expressed mainly by derivational affixes. 
The mingling of aspect and aktionsart phenomena in the last century was partly due 
to the emphasis that was put on the investigation of Gothic, where the morphem ga- 
reached a certain degree of grammaticalization as a prefix expressing perfectivity. 
2Cf. Engelberg (1998:64ff) for a more detailed discussion of these phenomena. 
3As is well known this does not hold if a bare plural or a mass noun occurs in 
object position: ??she wrote papers / stuff in two weeks. 
the end of the event as in (7) while this is not the case with normal 
accomplishment verbs (i.e., verbs in which a durative event leading to a 
change of state is implied by the meaning of the verb) as can be seen in (8): 
If the verb is in the future tense, the adverbial always refers to the beginning 
of the whole event, and if it is in the past tense, it is likely to do so. 
(7) Rebecca won / will win the race at five 
(8) Rebecca cleaned up / will clean up her room at five 
Durative adverbials have been used as a diagnostics for verbs semantics 
since Romberg (1899) and Streitberg (1900). These adverbials (e.g., for two 
hours) usually combine with non-resultative durative verbs (9). They may 
also combine with non-resultative punctual verbs, in which case the verbs 
receive an iterative interpretation as in (10). This even seems to hold when 
the temporal adverbial denotes an extremely short period of time (11): 
(9) Rebecca jogged / was jogging for a couple of minutes 
(10) Rebecca hit / was hitting him for a couple of minutes (→ repeatedly) 
(11) Rebecca hopped / was hopping for two seconds   (→ repeatedly) 
Streitberg (1900) also noticed that punctual verbs do not occur as 
complements of aspectual verbs like beginnen ‘to start’ or aufhören ‘to stop’ 
as in (12). Again, this is possible if they can get an iterative interpretation 
as in (13), which is usually available for non-resultative punctual verbs: 
(12) *The vase started / stopped breaking 
(13) Jamaal started / stopped hopping   (→ repeatedly) 
Another long standing puzzle has been the question why some verbs 
cannot occur in the progressive aspect. Leaving aside restrictions on stative 
verbs for the moment, an approximate solution might be the following: 
While all durative verbs allow the progressive form, for punctual verbs there 
are occurrence and interpretation restrictions. Firstly, such restrictions 
include that non-resultative punctual verbs are interpreted iteratively when 
they occur in the progressive (14). Secondly, punctual verbs that presuppose 
a preceding event occur in the progressive, as in (15), where it is pre-
supposed that Rebecca participated in the race or was nearing the com-
pletion of her journey. In this case, the progressive sentence is related to the 
time of this preceding event. Finally, punctual verbs that do not belong to 
these two types - especially those that lead to cognitive states - do not allow 
the progressive (16) (Engelberg 1998:74ff). 
(14) Rebecca was pinching Jamaal / was hopping   (→ repeatedly) 
(15) Rebecca was winning the race / was arriving 
(16) ??Rebecca was noticing that / ??that was astonishing Rebecca 
Other phenomena related to punctuality concern syntactic structures. 
Among these is a valence alternation between an accusative object and a PP 
headed by an. This alternation is restricted to verbs that refer to events that 
i) are non-punctual and ii) are followed by a result state; i.e., it is restricted 
to durative verbs (DUR) verbs that express a change of state (CS) like 
schreiben ‘to write’, bauen ‘to build’, nähen ‘to sew’, in contrast to punc-
tual verbs (PCT) like sprengen ‘to blast, to blow up’, brechen ‘to break’, 
knicken ‘to fold’ (Engelberg 1994): 
(17) Rebecca baute eine Hundehütte / an einer Hundehütte [DUR; CS] 
 approx.: ‘she built / was building a doghouse’ 
 (literally: “she built a doghouse / at a doghouse”) 
(18) Rebecca streichelte ihre Katze / *an ihrer Katze  [DUR] 
 ‘she petted / was petting her cat’ 
(19) Rebecca sprengte die Brücke / *an der Brücke  [PCT; CS] 
 ‘she blew up / was blowing up the bridge’ 
(20) Rebecca schlug ihren Freund / *an ihrem Freund [PCT] 
 ‘she hit / was hitting her friend’ 
Finally, according to Oya (1996), punctuality is among the conditions 
that determine the occurrence of the expletive reflexive pronoun sich with 
those intransitive verbs that take part in the causative-inchoative alternation 
in German. Verbs that do not occur with the reflexive pronoun are those 
that refer to punctual events (zersplittern ‘to shatter’, zerbrechen ‘to break’, 
abreißen ‘to tear off’), events that originate naturally (reifen ‘to ripen’, 
schmelzen ‘to melt’, gären ‘to ferment’), or to events that constitute move-
ments like rollen ‘to roll’, segeln ‘to sail’, or fliegen ‘to fly’: 
(21) der Zweig biegt sich / *der Zweig biegt  ‘the twig bends’ 
(22) *der Zweig bricht sich / der Zweig bricht ‘the twig breaks’ 
3  Describing the Data: A Lexical Event Structure Approach 
The descriptive value of a lexical-semantic theory of verbs depends on the 
extent to which it is able to map the distinctions in the syntactic and 
semantic behavior of verbs onto distinctions in the lexical representations of 
these verbs. Having this in mind, notice that popular lexical semantic 
theories like thematic role approaches, decompositional theories or 
Pustejovsky-style event structure theories do not represent the punctual-
durative distinction (see examples below). 
With respect to data that cover the breadth of phenomena relevant to 
lexical semantics, it has been argued in Engelberg (1998) that a lexical 
event structure theory of a certain type is needed to describe and explain 
these phenomena. According to this lexical event structure (LES) theory, 
the meaning of a verb is to be represented as an event structure which has 
the following characteristics: 
i) Complexity of events: Verbs refer to events that are internally struc-
tured in the sense that they consist of different subevents (e1, e2, ..., en) 
and a possible result state (s). 
ii) Sorts of subevents: Subevents are durative (eDUR) or punctual (ePCT). 
iii) Relations between subevents: Subevents are causally and temporally 
related; a subevent can, e.g., precede another subevent (<), or subevents 
can be temporally parallel (<>). 
iv) Participation in subevents: The event participants which correspond to 
the verb arguments are not necessarily involved in all subevents, but 
rather only in some of them; participants and subevents are related by 
semantic relations like ‘control’, ‘move’, ‘volition’, etc., out of which 
thematic relations can be computed. 
v) Implication vs. presupposition: The occurrence of a subevent can be 
entailed (==>I) or presupposed (==>P) by the verb’s meaning. 
A verb like to dry off as in Ron dried off the table is represented in a 
thematic role approach as in (23) and in a decompositional approach (e.g., 
Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1996) as in (24), which also contains an 
additional sorted event argument e that is assumed in some decompositional 
theories (e.g., Wunderlich 1996). In Pustejovsky-style event structure 
theories the representation is as in (25) in which the event in the event 
structure ES is represented as consisting of a process and a state. Decom-
positional propositions are related to each subevent in an LCS’ structure out 
of which a familiar cause-become decomposition (LCS) can be constructed 
(Pustejovsky 1991). 
The representation of to dry off in the above described LES theory, as 
developed in Engelberg (1998), is shown in (26). It says that to dry off 
implies that the event it refers to consists of two subevents e1 and e2 and a 
result state s. The first durative subevent (e.g., Ron’s wiping the table), 
involving a controller (agent) and a theme is temporally parallel to the sec-
ond durative subevent (the becoming dry of the table) which is followed by a 
result state (the table being dry)4: 
(23) dry off:  x = Agent, y = Theme 
(24) dry off:  (CAUSE (x, BECOME(DRY (y)))) (eTRANSITION) 
(25) dry off: ES:  [[Process]        [State]  ]Transition 
   LCS’ [[act(x,y) & ¬dry(y)] [dry(y)] ] 
   LCS cause(act(x,y), become(dry(y)) 
(26) dry off:  (==>I e1-DUR: xControl, yTheme) <>  
      (==>I e2-DUR: yTheme) < (==>I s: yTheme) 
To what extent this theory is able to adequately map distinctions in the 
behavior of verbs onto lexical representations depends of course on what 
kinds of syntactic or semantic phenomena are considered to be relevant for 
lexical semantics at all. According to my understanding the objective of a 
lexical semantic theory is to support explanations for at least the following 
four types of phenomena. To illustrate each objective, the data described in 
section 2 will be revisited, and it will be shown how the relevant meaning 
distinctions are represented in the LES format. 
i) Semantics-syntax mapping: The theory should explain the relations 
between semantic argument structures and their corresponding syn-
tactic structures (‘linking’). Example: The valence alternation between 
an accusative object and an an-construction is restricted to durative 
verbs followed by a result state as is represented in the partial event 
structure5 in (27). 
ii) Grammatical-categorial restrictions: The theory should account for the 
(non-)occurrence of lexical items in certain grammatical categories. 
Example: The restriction of the progressive to those punctual verbs that 
                                                        
4The representation in (26) is an abbreviated form of a meaning postulate in a 
type-driven predicate logic with a lambda operator, the framework in which the LES 
theory has been elaborated in Engelberg (1998). 
5The LES in (27) - (30) is partial in the sense that verb specific information 
that does not influence the restrictions is omitted, which is indicated by "...". 
either do not involve a result state or that presuppose a preceding event 
involves verbs with an event structure as in (28) and (29). 
iii) Co-occurrence restrictions: The theory should express selectional 
restrictions. Example: PPs of the type in two hours are typically com-
bined with verbs with an event structure as in (30). 
iv) Interpretation restrictions: The theory should represent systematic 
restrictions concerning the interpretation of certain classes of lexical 
items. Example: The iterative interpretation in the progressive aspect 
involves verbs with the LES in (28). 
(27) ... (==>I en-DUR: xAgent, yTheme) ... < (==>I s: yTheme) 
(28) (==>I en-PCT: ...) 
(29) (==>P e1-DUR: ...) < (==>I e2-PCT: ...) < (==>I s: ...) 
(30) ... (==>I en-DUR: ..., y) < (==>I s: y) 
The last two sections have shown that the punctual-durative distinction 
plays a central role in lexical semantics since it involves all four types of 
phenomena. Furthermore, I have demonstrated that the lexical origin of the 
phenomena discussed can in principle be accounted for in the framework 
presented. 
4  Explaining the Data: The Meaning of ‘Punctuality’ 
I have argued elsewhere (Engelberg 1998, 1999) that although most lexical 
semantic theories are more or less successful in mapping distinctions in the 
semantic and syntactic behavior of verbs onto distinct structures in lexical 
representations, these theories do not put much effort into clarifying the 
semantics of these structures. The meaning representations are often 
semantically extremely vague, with the result that the syntactic and 
semantic phenomena to be explained tend to shape the representations in a 
circular way, thereby yielding empirically weak theories.  
To obtain meaning representations that can be examined independently 
of the phenomena they are supposed to explain three types of clarifications 
have to be obtained. Firstly, the logical type of the predicates used in the 
representations has to be determined, e.g., if ‘AGENT’ is a function or a 
relation between thing and event individuals, or between predicates and 
argument positions, etc., and if ‘PUNCTUAL’ is a first-order property of 
events or a second-order property of verbal predicates. Secondly, the truth 
conditions of these predicates have to be worked out more clearly than has 
been done so far in most lexical semantic theories. Finally, by developing 
identity criteria for the basic ontological sorts of individual variables it has 
to be shown what these variables stand for, i.e., it must be clear what, for 
example, the event variable e represents. In the following, I will pursue the 
first two questions with respect to the predicate ‘PUNCTUAL’. 
There have been only very few approaches which, like Vendler (1957), 
relate the class of expressions which are called ‘punctual’ in this paper to 
the notion of an ‘instant’ in temporal logic. Vendler (1957:157) writes 
about achievements like win the race6:  
”A won a race between t1 and t2, means that the time instant at 
which A won that race is between t1 and t2.”  
While this might be justified for the few examples given by Vendler, it 
seems that most ‘punctual’ events (as expressed in to break, to jump, to 
blast, to knock, etc.) have a certain duration. This has been noticed by most 
researchers before and after Vendler, too, beginning with Herling 
(1840:107), Pott (1859:178), Goodwin (1889:16f), and others. Sarauw 
(1905:147) observes: 
“Since a shot lasts for a moment, it does take up some time, that is 
to say, the beginning and the end do not coincide: the shot is not a 
point in the sense of mathematics, but a point as it stands on a 
sheet of paper, a point with a certain extension.”7 
What is then the meaning of the predicate ‘punctual’ if it does not refer 
to an instant or an instantaneous event in the sense of temporal logic? A 
claim often made is that an event can simply be linguistically presented as 
having no duration, or some hint is made at a cognitive device for con-
ceiving of events as punctual even if they are not. 
                                                        
6The only elaborated approach to ‘instantaneous’ events I’m aware of is Piñon 
(1997). Introducing boundaries in the basic ontology he can formalize the seemingly 
contradictory idea, that an event, i.e., an entity that involves a change, can occur at 
an instant. 
7My translation of: "Der schuss dauert einen moment, also dauert er, also 
fallen anfang und ende nicht ganz zusammen: der schuss ist kein punkt im sinne der 
mathematik, sondern ein punkt wie er auf dem papier steht, mit einer gewissen 
ausdehnung." 
An early example is Curtius (1863), who like many other researchers of 
that time develops a distinction between punctuality and durativity with the 
aim of capturing the distinction between perfective and imperfective verb 
stems in classical Greek. His notion of punctuality involves, like many 
others, a spatial analogy: 
“The expression ‘point of time’ is familiar. It is this notion I’m 
taking up when I say that the action of the aorist can be compared 
to a p o i n t . A point has no extension, and surely no less can be 
said of the action expressed by the aorist, whose temporal extension 
is left out of consideration. Actions expressed by speakers as simply 
occurring [i.e., which are referred to by aorist forms] appear as 
points to the spectator, just as objects that are far away or receding 
into the background do, despite their factual extension in space.”8 
(Curtius 1863:174) 
An early example of an explanation which postulates an ability to 
conceive of events as punctual can be found in Pott (1859), who treats 
aspectual pairs and verb pairs related by aktionsart differences on a par and 
therefore makes punctuality a lexical distinction. He claims that with verb 
pairs in Slavic and pairs in German like sitzen ‘to sit’ / sich setzen ‘to sit 
down’ one can discover “[...] that in these pairs reference to the same kind 
of temporal property is made, which involves - to illustrate the matter 
briefly and aptly by borrowing a spatial metaphor - whether they are 
thought of as being p u n c t u a l  in their duration (which, of course, is 
impossible in the strongest mathematical sense and therefore only relatively 
true) or being l i n e a r ” (Pott 1859:178).9  
                                                        
8My translation of: "Der Ausdruck Zeitpunkt ist geläufig. An ihn knüpfe ich 
an, wenn ich sage, dass die Handlung des Aorists einem P u n k t e  verglichen 
werden könne. Dem Punkte kommt bekanntlich gar keine Ausdehnung zu, ebenso 
wenig kommt bei der durch den Aorist bezeichneten Handlung ihre zeitliche 
Erstreckung in Betracht. Und wie entfernte oder in den Hintergrund tretende 
Gegenstände, trotz ihrer factischen Ausdehnung im Raume, doch als Punkte 
erscheinen, so auch vom sprechenden die Handlungen, die er eben nur als ein-
tretende aufführt." 
9My translation of: "[...] in beiden Rücksichtnahme auf eine gleiche Eigen-
schaft der Zeit, nämlich danach, ob sie - um die Sache durch ein vom Raume ent-
lehntes Bild in Kürze und schlagend zu veranschaulichen - ihrer Dauer nach 
A more poetic variant of this kind of semantics we owe to Gildersleeve 
(1902:251): 
“Tense of duration, tense of momentum, would not be so 
objectionable, but, unfortunately, duration has to be explained and 
the seat of the duration put where it belongs, in the eye of the 
beholder, in the heart of the sympathizer, and not in the action 
itself. Describe a rapid action and you have the imperfect. Sum up 
a long action and you have the aorist.” 
Interestingly, more recent and partly formalized approaches to 
aspectuality do not differ very much from the older definitions. Platzack 
(1979:93) claims that punctual verbs refer to events “that do not last in time 
(or rather, are not conceived of as lasting in time)” and Moens (1987:102) 
states: 
“[...] processes and culminated processes can be »compressed« into 
points. This [...] does not mean that they cease to have a temporal 
duration, but rather that their internal structure is no longer of 
importance.” 
While the claim that ‘punctual’ verbs refer to logical instants is not 
justified by the reference of most of these verbs, the assumption that we 
conceive of events as being punctual or that punctuality is a property of 
verbs does not make much sense either. Concrete events involve a change 
over time, i.e., duration is an essential property of these events.10 What it is 
that we are in fact doing in conceiving of events as having no duration is 
not conceiving of them as events anymore. It is for this reason that attempts 
to clarify the meaning of the notion of ‘punctuality’ have not been very 
satisfying so far.  
At first sight, it seems surprising anyways that languages distinguish 
between verbs that refer to short events and those that refer to longer events. 
Most other central concepts in lexical semantics like ‘cause’, ‘agent’ or 
‘will’ play a central role in our overall cognitive architecture. I will present 
evidence that this holds for the durative-punctual distinction, too. A look at 
                                                                                                                      
p u n k t u e l l  gedacht wird (was freilich in strengster mathematischer Strenge 
unmöglich und demnach nur beziehungsweise wahr), oder l i n e a r ." 
10Cf. Engelberg (1998:216ff) for an extensive discussion on event ontology. 
the research on cognitive time concepts reveals that a short interval of 2 to 3 
seconds plays a crucial role for perception, behavior, and speech production. 
The following phenomena involve this three-second interval which I will 
refer to as the ‘cognitive moment’11: 
i) Errors in the estimation of the length of intervals: Experiments show 
that the length of short acoustic or visual stimuli is overestimated while 
the length of long stimuli is underestimated; the threshold between 
over- and underestimation lies between 2 and 2.5 seconds (Pöppel 
1978). 
ii) Oscillation of extremely faint sounds: Faint, barely audible acoustic 
stimuli like the ticking of a watch held some distance from the ear are 
only perceived periodically; the rhythmic appearance and disappear-
ence of the sound perception occurs every couple of seconds 
(Urbantschitsch 1875). 
iii) Rhythm of metronome beats: Regular metronome beats of equal 
acoustic quality are perceived as units of two (or more); this “tick-tock” 
effect disappears if the distance between two beats exceeds about 2.5 
seconds (Wundt 1911). 
iv) Oscillation of ambivalent patterns: The perception of ambivalent 
patterns like the Necker cube below oscillates between the two readings 
of the pattern at least every three seconds or so; to a large degree this 
occurs independently of the will of the observer (Pöppel 1985). 
 
v) Distance between pauses in speech production: Crosslinguistic 
investigations of spoken lyrics show a tendency towards rhythms with 
short pauses about every 3 seconds (Turner and Pöppel 1985). 
Comparable rhythms can be found in normal speech (Pöppel 1985). It 
                                                        
11For a more thorough presentation and discussion of the following phenom-
ena, cf. Engelberg (1999). 
has independently been noticed that rhythmic pauses in speech are not 
explained by the demands of breathing rhythms (Handel 1989). 
vi) Rhythm of actions: Intercultural investigations show that simple actions 
like scratching, hand-shaking, knocking, chopping a tree, waving, or 
hammering tend to be bundled into rhythmic groups with a length of 
two to three seconds, interrupted by short breaks (Feldhütter, Schleidt 
and Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1990). 
The cognitive moment or “subjective present” as this interval has been 
called is determined by a neural mechanism that integrates successive 
events into a perceptual gestalt whose duration is restricted to an upper limit 
of about three seconds (Pöppel 1985:53). This gestalt creates something like 
a “window of consciousness” that induces a “feeling of nowness”. Since the 
perception of events and the structure of our own actions is determined by 
the cognitve moment, it can be assumed that our general cognitive concept 
of events involves a classification of events that is mirrored in the way we 
use verbs to talk about events: punctual events are events that don’t take 
longer than the time of the cognitive moment while durative events exceed 
this three-second interval. 
Since the proposed conception of punctuality is based largely on our 
perceptual system, it relates to relatively simple, concrete events. The basic 
readings of verbs can be defined as those readings in which reference is 
made to events that are immediately available perceptually, as for example 
in (31). But metaphorical readings often involve reference to more abstract 
events in which the temporal structure of the basic reading is not completely 
preserved as in (32) which we can hardly call ‘punctual’ in the sense that it 
refers to an interval shorter than three seconds. Nevertheless, in both 
readings the accusative object cannot be replaced by the an-construction 
showing that the basic reading of the verb determines its behavior.12  
(31) sie spaltete das Brett / *an dem Brett 
 ‘she split the board / was splitting the board’ 
(32) sie spaltete die Partei / *an der Partei 
 ‘she divided (“split”) the party / was dividing the party’  
Thus, finally, if we want to conceive of ‘punctuality’ as a second-order 
property we can call those verbs punctual that refer to punctual events in 
their basic reading. 
                                                        
12Cf. for a more detailed discussion Engelberg (1999). 
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